Scalamoondis

i. Executive Summary

In this policy brief, I propose that social media platforms, message boards, and other online communication structures should have the capacity to censor, ban, or de-platform users at their discretion since they are private companies and forums.

Online communication platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Reddit are private platforms, essentially like private online properties or communities. Although one of their many functions invites a form of public discourse amongst its users, they are not considered public forums or settings under the law.

The First Amendment Law “protects freedom of speech and the press” by prohibiting Congress from restricting these rights in the form of law. Freedom of speech is extended to any public forum, such as sidewalks, government property, or public theatres. A forum, under the First Amendment, designates a place in which a person speaks. In 1983, the SCOTUS established the boundaries of what is deemed a public forum by dividing them into 3 separate designations: traditional public forums, designated forums, and nonpublic forums. Some Traditional Public Forums have already been stated: public parks or sidewalks. Designated Public Forums are properties that the government opens for public expression even though the public property is not considered a Traditional Public Forum. An example of a Designated Public Forum could include meeting rooms at state universities. Thirdly, there are what’s called Limited Public Forums. Limited Public Forums are locations where the government changes “a non-public forum into a public forum voluntarily for expressive activity that may be restricted as to subject matter or class of speaker.” An example could be the opening of a fine-art venue to the public for discourse on the topic of Global Climate Crisis.

Online communication platforms, like the few listed at the beginning of the brief, fall under none of these designations. While openly accessible to the use of the public, these platforms are not public property, government property, or under special provisions of the U.S government. It is fully within the power of the person to join, leave, or continue to participate on said platforms depending on their satisfaction. If a platform is consistent in their allowance of language, rhetoric, connection, or action that is deemed offensive, violent, or unsatisfactory, judged by the individual user, then it is within the users’ benefit to discontinue use and support of that platform. I recommend that this process, if followed through by the population on a large enough scale, should effectively ostracize online platforms that promote hate speech, violent opinions and tendencies, and prejudice. This strategy democratically allows the population to evaluate which platforms are deemed worthy of use, individually, which will reflect the collective consensus as an end result.

ii. Introduction

Most online communication platforms literally require the user to agree to a set list of Terms and Conditions upon creation of their account and use of their platform, Twitter’s for example: “1. Who May Use the Services … You may use the Services only if you agree to form a binding contract with Twitter…” This agreement, contract between the platform and user, if you will, must be completed before accessibility is granted to the user. By agreeing to the Terms and Conditions, the user is explicitly stating that they understand their range of limitations and capabilities within the scope of use on the said platform. Take Donald Trump’s expulsion from Twitter for example: by agreeing to the Terms and Conditions contract between Twitter and himself, regardless if he is a political figure, his account, content, and activity on the said platform is under the jurisdiction and discretion of Twitter. To make another example of Twitter, Elon Musk’s recent acquisition of the platform has not only led to employees leaving the company, but also, we’ve seen “Big Businesses” such as Delta, Pfizer, and General Motors “fleeing” the social media platform. Most of the employees and businesses leaving the platform are doing so under the worries of large spread misinformation and hate speech; this is a clear demonstration of the strategy being purposed in this policy brief. These populations are dissatisfied with the platform, so they are pursuing, or creating, other online communication alternatives that better align with their values and standards. 

As the article by The Conversation has warned however, de-platforming and censorship often yield the creation of other platforms that serve as echo chambers for users of hate-speech and violent tendencies due to their more relaxed Terms and Conditions contract. The authors of the article believe that “de-platforming” helps curb some of the offensive tendencies of users, but they also believe that it not a long-term solution, that a better approach will “take into account the complicated technological and social consequences of addressing the root problem of extremist and violent Web communities.” Here we can see the population of people that prefer more violent language, rhetoric, and action already actively using the strategy, defined in this brief, to their own perceived benefit allowing them to further congregate on other platforms. However, they are therefore successfully ostracizing themselves from the more positive consensus of society.

iii. Recommendations

As the executive summary stated, the brief proposes that the process of how this “censorship”, “de-platforming”, banning, and regulating takes form is entirely up to the discretion of the platforms. The explanation for this assigned power finds context in the idea that the entire stability of this proposition resides upon the current state of accessibility to use, change, and create online communication platforms. That is to say, if the fundamental structure of computers, the internet, or wireless communication were to change, this brief would become void.

Initially, this proposition looks like a means for oppressive oligarchies, but it is in the idea that the users contain the supreme, and final, powers in this interaction: by having the liberty to change, create, and leave platforms, online communication platforms are forcefully inclined to cater to the means of the user. Again, the best means of what this looks like and how it’s carried out, depends on the people of users. A starting example could be: a platform immediately installing a “ban, censor, de-platform appeal process” that acknowledges the user still retaining ultimate sway in the scenario, but the platform will go further to bring that comfort of power even into the realm of limiting the platform’s power.

In response to the call for a long-term solution, (para. 6), that considers the “root problem” of violent Web communities: on the grander scale, asking online communication platforms to solve the psychology, methodology, and philosophies of extremist and violent web communities seems like asking them to solve an infamous, complex, and enduring problem that has been studied for as long as society existed. Having said this, the responsibilities of a popular online communication containing interactions between millions of people, some being the most powerful people on the globe, cannot be ignored. While again it’s up to the users to decide, another starting example could be: platforms incorporating a mandatory reflection questionnaire or prompt containing the platform’s reason and the context they used to come to their regulatory decision, as well as, mandatory user input and review of the regulatory decision and it’s processes before they can return to using the platform; this user input can also be additional and handled separately to the “ban, censor, de-platform appeal process” stated in the paragraph above. Hypothetically, if the platform was deeply grounded in the collaboration of groups and institutions that research and pursue healthier, more inclusive social/online environments, the platform could process this input to provide catered services to the population of users and be equipped with deeper user information to better approach actions that handle “the root problem” of violent Web communities. 

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Works Cited

1. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/our-government/the-constitution/#:~:text=The%20First%20Amendment%20provides%20that,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances.
2.  Camp, Emma. “Yes, You Can Yell ‘Fire’ in a Crowded Theater.” Reason.com. Reason Foundation, October 27, 2022. https://reason.com/2022/10/27/yes-you-can-yell-fire-in-a-crowded-theater/?utm_medium=email.
3. “Forums.” Legal Information Institute. The University of Cornell. Accessed November 29, 2022. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums#.
4. “Limited Public Forum Definition & Meaning.” Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Accessed November 29, 2022. https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/limited%20public%20forum. 
5. “What Is Hate Speech?” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed November 29, 2022. https://www.un.org/en/hate-speech/understanding-hate-speech/what-is-hate-speech. 
6. Terms of Service, Twitter Inc. 2022 https://twitter.com/en/tos
7. Germain, Thomas. “Here Are All the Big Advertisers Who Left Twitter since Elon Took Over.” Gizmodo. Gizmodo, November 7, 2022. https://gizmodo.com/elon-musk-twitter-list-of-advertisers-leaving-1849751644. 
8. Blackburn, Jeremy, Robert W Gehl, and Ugochukwu Etudo. “Does ‘Deplatforming’ Work to Curb Hate Speech and Calls for Violence? 3 Experts in Online Communications Weigh In.” The Conversation, October 25, 2022. https://theconversation.com/does-deplatforming-work-to-curb-hate-speech-and-calls-for-violence-3-experts-in-online-communications-weigh-in-153177.